We study pollution cleanup in the Ganges in Varanasi, India. Voters elect politicians and elected politicians decide how much pollution to clean up. Between the two time periods, there is an election. Politicians are sincere or insincere. The marginal cost of public funds ζ measures how efficiently elected politicians transform tax receipts into pollution cleanup. Voters have identical per period utility functions. We ascertain the equilibrium outcome and per period voter welfare. Second, we show that an increase in ζ reduces the equilibrium pollution cleanup and voter welfare. Third, an insincere politician can delay the revelation of his insincerity. We show that a critical value of ζ,ζ^*, exists such that the insincere incumbent separates and loses the election if and only if ζ>ζ^* and that he pools and is re-elected otherwise. Finally, we note that an increase in ζ can raise voter welfare when politicians are more likely to be insincere.

中文翻译：

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恒河污染治理问题的政治经济学模型

我们研究印度瓦拉纳西恒河的污染清理工作。选民选举政客，民选政客决定要清理多少污染。在这两个时间段之间，有一次选举。政客是真诚的或不真诚的。The marginal cost of public funds ζ measures how efficiently elected politicians transform tax receipts into pollution cleanup. 选民具有相同的每期效用函数。我们确定均衡结果和每个时期的选民福利。其次，我们表明 ζ 的增加会减少平衡污染清理和选民福利。第三，一个不诚实的政客可以延迟他不诚实的揭露。我们表明，ζ，ζ^ *的临界值存在，使得imencere现任者分开并丢失选举如果ζ>ζ^ *并且他池并被删除。最后，