ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model.

中文翻译：

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谁控制控制器？腐败的动态模型

摘要 本文的目的是至少部分回答标题中提出的问题。一些作品分析了不同社会腐败的演变。大多数此类文件表明，中央当局必须采取多种控制措施来阻止腐败的扩大。然而，解决谁控制控制器的问题的文献并不多。本文旨在接近这个问题的答案。确实，众所周知，在民主社会中，公民应该发挥重要作用。我们表明，政治上活跃的公民可以防止腐败的蔓延。更准确地说，我们引入了政府和官员之间的博弈，双方都可以在腐败或诚实行为之间做出选择。公民具有政治影响力，导致腐败和非腐败政府的连任与否。这导致了对腐败的不容忍指数。我们通过复制器动力学构建了游戏的进化版本，并根据对腐败的不容忍指数和模型的其他相关数量来分析和充分表征系统的可能轨迹。