The papers in this special issue were presented at the Sixth Joint Japan–US Conference on Mathematical Sociology and Rational Choice held on August 2016 in Seattle, WA. The conference was cosponsored by two sections of the American Sociological Association (Mathematical Sociology and Rationality and Society) and by the Japanese Association for Mathematical Sociology. Professors Jun Kobayashi (Seikei University), Masayuki Kanai (Senshu University), Kikuko Nagayoshi (Tohoku University), John Skvoretz (University of South Florida), and Douglas Heckathorn (Cornell University) were the conference organizers. The four papers in this special issue are a subset of the papers that were invited for the issue, and these in turn were a subset of all the papers presented. Invited papers were selected by the organizers with an eye toward the generality of problem and depth of mathematical content. All submitted papers were peer reviewed as per the standard review procedures of the journal. Three of the papers are very much in the tradition of rational choice: “Late Marriage and Transition from Arranged Marriages to Love Matches” (Kezuka), “The Survival of Inefficient and Efficient Norms” (Kira), and “Self-organizing Collective Action” (Obayashi). Actors are assumed to gain utility from their actions but how much depends on the actions of others and on parametric factors of theoretical interest. Actors are presumed to maximize utility. Their behavioral strategies include first-order actions (such as cooperate or not) and possible higher-order actions that are sanctioning reactions to lower-order behaviors by others. The aim of analysis, generally, is to derive equilibrium conditions. The problems addressed in the Kira and Obayashi papers are quite broad, namely, collective action and the survival of norms of cooperation. The Kezuka paper is motivated by an empirical puzzle in developed countries with the specific example of Japan, in which there is increasing delay in first marriage. The fourth paper, “What Can You and I Do to Reduce Income Inequality?” (Jasso), differs from the others in several ways. There is no formal model of actors nor functional specification of the factors on which their utility depends. The point of paper is not to assume some action set available to actors and look for equilibrium conditions expressed as stable probabilities over strategies, but rather to develop an understanding of what actions are available to actors if they were to seek to reduce income inequality. In “Late Marriage and Transition from Arranged Marriages to Love Matches,” Kezuka links the delay to a change in the basis of marriage from arranged matches to love matches, a change that is driven in turn by a change in value system from traditional to individualistic. An important background element is the division of the actor population into different social classes because arranged matches can only occur between actors of the same class. Love matches can occur even if the classes of the actors differ. The analysis has two steps: a decision-making step which occurs within periods as single individuals consummate matches (or not) seeking to make an arranged marriage or a love marriage depending on whether they have traditional or individualistic preferences. Between periods, replicator dynamics are applied to the mix of traditional versus individualistic preference holders in the population. The proportions are changed in response to the expected satisfaction achieved by an actor. It is assumed that staying single brings less satisfaction than being in an arranged match, and the latter less than being in a love match. Expected satisfaction depends on the likely success of a search for a mate, which in turn depends on the type of match sought as determined by the searcher’s value system and the associated costs of search but also the current mix THE JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 2018, VOL. 42, NO. 4, 183–185 https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1442403

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不平等、合作、集体行动和延迟婚姻：第六届日美数学社会学与理性选择联合会议的论文

本期特刊中的论文发表于 2016 年 8 月在华盛顿州西雅图举行的第六届日美数学社会学与理性选择联合会议。本次会议由美国社会学协会（数学社会学和理性与社会）两个分会和日本数学社会学协会共同主办。Jun Kobayashi 教授（Seikei 大学）、Masayuki Kanai（Senshu 大学）、Kikuko Nagayoshi（东北大学）、John Skvoretz（南佛罗里达大学）和 Douglas Heckathorn（康奈尔大学）是会议的组织者。本期特刊中的四篇论文是本期受邀论文的子集，而这些又是所有提交论文的子集。主办方根据问题的普遍性和数学内容的深度选择了受邀论文。所有提交的论文都按照期刊的标准评审程序进行了同行评审。其中三篇论文非常具有理性选择的传统：“晚婚和从安排婚姻到爱情匹配的过渡”（Kezuka）、“低效和高效规范的生存”（Kira）和“自组织集体行动” ”（大林）。假设参与者从他们的行为中获得效用，但多少取决于其他人的行为和理论兴趣的参数因素。假定参与者最大化效用。他们的行为策略包括一阶动作（例如合作与否）和可能的高阶动作，这些动作是制裁他人对低阶行为的反应。通常，分析的目的是推导出平衡条件。Kira 和 Obayashi 论文中解决的问题相当广泛，即集体行动和合作规范的存续。Kezuka 论文的动机是发达国家的一个实证难题，以日本为例，其中初婚越来越延迟。第四篇论文，“你我能做些什么来减少收入不平等？” (Jasso)，在几个方面与其他人不同。没有正式的参与者模型，也没有对其效用所依赖的因素的功能规范。论文的重点不是假设一些行动者可用的行动集，并寻找表达为策略稳定概率的均衡条件，而是要了解如果行动者想要减少收入不平等，他们可以采取哪些行动。在《晚婚与从包婚到情婚的过渡》中，Kezuka将延迟与婚姻基础从包婚到情婚的变化联系起来，这种变化又是由价值体系从传统到个人主义的转变所驱动的。 . 一个重要的背景元素是将演员人口划分为不同的社会阶层，因为安排好的比赛只能发生在同一阶层的演员之间。即使演员的等级不同，也可能发生爱情匹配。分析分为两步：一个决策步骤，发生在单身人士完美匹配（或不匹配）寻求包办婚姻或爱情婚姻的时期内，这取决于他们是否具有传统或个人偏好。在不同时期之间，复制动力被应用于人群中传统偏好持有者与个人偏好持有者的混合。比例会根据演员达到的预期满意度而改变。假设保持单身比安排比赛带来的满足感要小，而后者比在爱情比赛中带来的满足感要小。预期的满意度取决于寻找配偶的可能性，这反过来又取决于搜索者的价值体系和相关搜索成本所确定的匹配类型，以及当前的组合 THE JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 2018, VOL。42，没有。4, 183–185 https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1442403