ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the dynamics of collective action through collective reputation, which indicates the extent to which groups succeed. Many previous works introduced psychological traits such as irrationality and a sense of fairness to explain the diffusion of collective action. However, this paper analyzes the relationship between cooperation and dynamic change in group size using game-theoretic models. The results show the sets of parameters in which positive feedback between cooperation and group size occurs. In these parameter sets, cooperation creates a good collective image (reputation) and encourages outsiders to join the group. In turn, the group expansion gives them incentives to cooperate. Additionally, when this positive feedback functions, punishment is found to be unnecessary for cooperation.

中文翻译：

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自组织集体行动：集体声誉的集体动力

摘要 本文通过集体声誉分析了集体行动的动态，这表明了群体成功的程度。许多以前的作品引入了非理性和公平感等心理特征来解释集体行动的扩散。然而，本文使用博弈论模型分析了合作与群体规模的动态变化之间的关系。结果显示了合作与团体规模之间发生正反馈的参数集。在这些参数集中，合作创造了良好的集体形象（声誉）并鼓励外人加入团体。反过来，集团扩张给了他们合作的动力。此外，当这种正反馈起作用时，发现合作不需要惩罚。