ABSTRACT The shift to a genetic basis of evolution in the 1960s, and away from group selection, created a problem in regard to the origin of cooperative behavior in human societies. The resolution essentially involves mutual recognition of individuals, thus permitting the phenomena of reputation, reciprocation, and retribution to arise, these being key to stable cooperative societies. The analysis presented, based on evolutionary game theory, serves to emphasize the crucial role of individual recognition by illustrating the consequences of assuming the opposite. It is shown that where tribal membership is apparent, but individuals are not recognizable, evolving mistrust leads to tribal extinction in an evolutionary game theory model. Moreover, a single tribe is also unstable to schism. Subsequently, the extinction of one schismatic group occurs. Failure to recognize individuals therefore facilitates a mechanism which leads to increasing conformity.

中文翻译：

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具有进化的群体级混合策略的迭代两人游戏中的群体灭绝

摘要 1960 年代向进化的遗传基础转变，并远离群体选择，在人类社会合作行为的起源方面产生了问题。该决议本质上涉及个人的相互承认，从而允许出现声誉、回报和报应现象，这些是稳定合作社会的关键。所提出的分析基于进化博弈论，通过说明假设相反的后果来强调个体识别的关键作用。结果表明，在部落成员身份明显但个体无法识别的情况下，进化博弈论模型中不断发展的不信任会导致部落灭绝。而且，单个部落也不稳定。随后，发生了一个分裂群体的灭绝。