ABSTRACT This short note clarifies how the Stackelberg leader’s competitive advantage after the follower’s entry affects the leader’s optimal market entry decision and Stackelberg strategic interactions under uncertainty. Although the Stackelberg leader’s first investment threshold remains constant and coincides with the monopolist’s investment trigger, his second (third) investment threshold, which defines the exit (entry) of the first (second) investment interval, increases with an increased competitive advantage. With an increased competitive advantage, the probability of sequential investment equilibrium (simultaneous investment equilibrium) increases (decreases) irrespective of the level of volatility. Moreover, for a given level of competitive advantage, an increase in the volatility tends to decrease (increase) the probability of simultaneous investment equilibrium (sequential investment equilibrium). For a richer set of results, endogenous firm roles are examined and analyzed as well. The leader’s preemptive threshold is negatively affected by his competitive advantage.

中文翻译：

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技术说明：斯塔克尔伯格领导-跟随博弈中竞争优势对投资时机的影响

摘要 这篇简短的笔记阐明了在跟随者进入后斯塔克尔伯格领导者的竞争优势如何影响领导者的最优市场进入决策和不确定性下的斯塔克尔伯格战略互动。尽管斯塔克尔伯格领导者的第一投资门槛保持不变并且与垄断者的投资触发一致，但他的第二（第三）投资门槛定义了第一（第二）投资区间的退出（进入），随着竞争优势的增加而增加。随着竞争优势的增加，无论波动水平如何，连续投资均衡（同时投资均衡）的概率都会增加（减少）。此外，对于给定的竞争优势水平，波动性的增加往往会降低（增加）同时投资均衡（顺序投资均衡）的概率。为了获得更丰富的结果，还检查和分析了内生的公司角色。领导者的抢占阈值受到其竞争优势的负面影响。