ABSTRACT This paper deals with Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on specific union stable systems given by the winning coalitions derived from a voting game. This framework allows for analyzing new and real situations in which there exists a feedback between the economic influence of each coalition of agents and its political power. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the Harsanyi power solutions on the subclass of union stable systems arisen from the winning coalitions from a voting game when the influence is determined by a power index. In particular, we establish comparable axiomatizations, in this context, when considering the Shapley-Shubik power index, the Banzhaf index and the Equal division power index which reduces to the Myerson value on union stable systems. Finally, a new characterization for the Harsanyi power solutions on the whole class of union stable systems is provided and, as a consequence, a characterization of the Myerson value is obtained when the equal power measure is considered.

中文翻译：

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投票结构合作博弈的 Harsanyi 权力解决方案

摘要 本文讨论了合作博弈的 Harsanyi 权力解决方案，其中部分合作基于特定的联合稳定系统，该系统由投票博弈派生的获胜联盟给出。该框架允许分析新的和真实的情况，其中每个代理人联盟的经济影响与其政治权力之间存在反馈。当影响由权力指数确定时，我们提供了对联合稳定系统子类的 Harsanyi 权力解决方案的公理化特征，该系统是从投票游戏中获胜的联盟产生的。特别是，在考虑 Shapley-Shubik 幂指数、Banzhaf 指数和等分幂指数时，我们建立了可比较的公理化，后者在联合稳定系统上简化为 Myerson 值。最后，