This study is an empirical investigation of the potential for communication and observability interventions to increase cooperation around communal water treatment systems amongst villagers in rural India. Despite the dependence of many rural communities in India on communal water sources and treatment plants for safe drinking water, they often fail to collectively manage these resources, resulting in abandoned water points and treatment systems with consequent health and mortality impacts. Results of public goods games framed in terms of the management of communal water treatment systems suggest that these communities can cooperate to provide the public good. However, public disclosure of behaviour had the very significant effect of decreasing contributions to the public good. Analysis indicates that early rounds of play were critical in this regard: the observed behaviours of other individuals at the start of play strongly determined subsequent cooperation levels. Thus, frequently-observed free-riding behaviour in early rounds of the game led other players to follow suit. Only when participants were actively encouraged to negotiate agreements, did cooperation increase significantly - albeit intermittently. Overall, findings suggest that interventions that provide opportunities for communication and negotiation may be most effective at enhancing cooperation around communal water treatment plants, while the impacts of interventions that make behaviour observable are strongly dependent on behaviour in the early stages of cooperative interaction.

这项研究是对交流和可观察性干预措施的潜力进行的实证研究，以加强印度农村地区村民在公共水处理系统周围的合作。尽管印度许多农村社区依靠公共水源和污水处理厂来获得安全的饮用水，但他们常常无法统一管理这些资源，导致废弃的供水点和污水处理系统对健康和死亡率造成影响。就公共水处理系统的管理而言，公共产品博弈的结果表明，这些社区可以合作提供公共物品。但是，公开披露行为对减少行为具有非常显着的影响。对公益事业的贡献。分析表明，在这方面，早期比赛至关重要：在比赛开始时观察到的其他人的行为强烈决定了随后的合作水平。因此，在游戏早期回合中经常观察到的搭便车行为导致其他玩家效仿。只有积极地鼓励参与者谈判协议，合作才会显着增加-尽管是间歇性的。总体而言，研究结果表明，提供交流和谈判机会的干预措施可能最有效地增强了公共水处理厂周围的合作，而使行为可观察的干预措施的影响在很大程度上取决于合作互动的早期阶段的行为。