Abstract Whilst the deployment of next generation access networks (NGANs) is undoubtedly beneficial to the economy, new legal developments in the United States (US) regarding the issue of net neutrality (NN) pose a new challenge not only to policy makers but to telecommunication providers as well, that could justify a fresh approach when assessing NGANs investments. In particular, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) subverted extant NN rules in the US and if the European Union (EU) decides to follow a similar deregulatory path in the future it could change the way telecommunications providers on both sides of the Atlantic lay down their optical-fibre network infrastructure investment plans. For instance, if traffic prioritization is allowed then diversification of revenue sources can be achieved by charging customers for privileged data delivery to their premises. Currently, NGANs roll-out throughout EU is an ongoing process in a setting whereby access regulation in the form of network element unbundling is already imposed. As a result, these legal developments form a new context within which it makes sense to assess the role of NGANs wholesale access pricing in tandem with the degree of commitment to NN rules so as to i) determine their combinatorial impact on private telecommunications operators' financial figures and ii) capture their competitive interactions. Towards this end, an important aspect of particular value to market players (i.e. incumbents and competitive providers – CPs), and policy makers (i.e. National Regulatory Authorities – NRAs) that this article aims to examine is how to employ the option-game (OG) analysis, that reflects the intersection of game theory (GT) and real options (ROs), to model the competitive interactions between participants in a particular competition game set-up by means of deriving possible Nash-equilibrium (NE) outcomes within a regulatory setting part of which is the commitment or non-commitment to the NN principle. This, hybrid, evaluation tool is applied on top of a conventional discounted cash flow (DCF) techno-economic analysis assessment of an NGAN investment opportunity.

中文翻译：

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调查批发接入定价和网络中立原则承诺对欧洲下一代接入网络私人投资计划的交织影响：一种用于捕捉市场参与者竞争互动的期权游戏应用程序

摘要 虽然下一代接入网络 (NGAN) 的部署无疑对经济有利，但美国 (US) 关于网络中立性 (NN) 问题的新法律发展不仅对政策制定者而且对电信行业构成了新的挑战。提供商也一样，这可以证明在评估 NGAN 投资时采用新方法是合理的。特别是，美国联邦通信委员会 (FCC) 颠覆了美国现有的 NN 规则，如果欧盟 (EU) 决定在未来走类似的放松管制路径，它可能会改变大西洋两岸的电信供应商制定计划的方式他们的光纤网络基础设施投资计划。例如，如果允许流量优先排序，则可以通过向客户收取将特权数据传输到其场所的费用来实现收入来源的多样化。目前，NGAN 在整个欧盟的推广是一个持续的过程，其中已经实施了网络元素分拆形式的访问监管。因此，这些法律发展形成了一个新的背景，在其中评估 NGAN 批发接入定价的作用以及对 NN 规则的承诺程度是有意义的，以便 i) 确定它们对私营电信运营商财务的组合影响数字和 ii) 捕捉他们的竞争互动。为此，市场参与者（即现有企业和竞争性供应商 – CP）和政策制定者（即 本文旨在研究的国家监管机构 – NRAs) 是如何使用期权博弈 (OG) 分析，反映博弈论 (GT) 和实物期权 (RO) 的交集，对参与者之间的竞争互动进行建模通过在监管环境中推导出可能的纳什均衡 (NE) 结果的特定竞争游戏设置，其中部分是对 NN 原则的承诺或不承诺。这种混合评估工具应用于对 NGAN 投资机会的传统贴现现金流 (DCF) 技术经济分析评估之上。通过在监管环境中推导可能的纳什均衡 (NE) 结果来模拟特定竞争游戏设置中参与者之间的竞争互动，其中一部分是对 NN 原则的承诺或不承诺。这种混合评估工具应用于对 NGAN 投资机会的传统贴现现金流 (DCF) 技术经济分析评估之上。通过在监管环境中推导可能的纳什均衡 (NE) 结果来模拟特定竞争游戏设置中参与者之间的竞争互动，其中一部分是对 NN 原则的承诺或不承诺。这种混合评估工具应用于对 NGAN 投资机会的传统贴现现金流 (DCF) 技术经济分析评估之上。