We analyse the short-time work (STW) regulations that several OECD countries introduced after the 2007 financial crisis. We view these measures as a collection of real options and study the dynamic effect of STW on the endogenous liquidation decision of the firm. While STW delays a firm’s liquidation, it is not necessarily welfare enhancing. Moreover, it turns out that firms use STW too long. We show (numerically) that providers of capital benefit more than employees from STW. Benefits for employees can even be negative. A typical Nordic policy performs better than a typical Anglo-Saxon policy for all stakeholders.

中文翻译：

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关于公司短期工作政策的选择价值

我们分析了一些OECD国家在2007年金融危机之后制定的短期工作（STW）法规。我们将这些措施视为一组实物期权，并研究STW对公司内生清算决策的动态影响。尽管STW延迟了公司的清算，但这并不一定能提高福利水平。而且，事实证明，企业使用STW的时间过长。我们（从数字上显示）表明，资本提供者比STW员工受益更多。给员工带来的好处甚至可能是负面的。对于所有利益相关者而言，典型的北欧政策要比典型的盎格鲁撒克逊政策表现更好。