Abstract Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto optimal alternatives at each profile of individual preferences? Using the framework of fixed-agenda social choice theory, we present a characterization of the Pareto optimal social choice correspondence. We introduce a new independence condition, P -independence. When combined with three natural assumptions, P -independence leads to the conclusion that the social choice set and the Pareto optimal set are the same.

中文翻译：

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帕累托最优的基础

摘要 对于社会在个人偏好的每个配置文件中选择所有且仅帕累托最优替代方案的要求，能否给出一个公理化的理由？使用固定议程社会选择理论的框架，我们提出了帕累托最优社会选择对应的特征。我们引入了一个新的独立条件，P-independence。当结合三个自然假设时，P 独立性导致社会选择集和帕累托最优集相同的结论。