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Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
Journal of Mathematical Economics ( IF 1.0 ) Pub Date : 2020-05-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004
Lars Ehlers , Dipjyoti Majumdar , Debasis Mishra , Arunava Sen

Abstract In models without transfers, we show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, can only take ordinal, but not cardinal information into account. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.

中文翻译:

基本机制中的连续性和激励兼容性

摘要 在没有转移的模型中,我们表明每个满足连续性条件的基数激励兼容投票机制只能考虑序数信息,而不考虑基数信息。我们的结果适用于许多没有转移的机制设计标准模型,包括具有任何域限制的标准投票模型。
更新日期:2020-05-01
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