Abstract Given a group of agents, the queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to serve agents and the monetary transfers they should receive. In this paper, we characterize interesting subfamilies of the VCG mechanisms by investigating the implications of either no-envy or solidarity requirements. First, we present a characterization of the strategy-proofand envy-freemechanisms. Next, we present characterizations of VCG mechanisms satisfying one of two different formulations of cost monotonicity or population monotonicity. Finally, we show that among the envy-free and strategy-proof mechanisms, the only ones that satisfy one of two formulations of cost monotonicity or population monotonicity are extensions of the pivotal or the reward-based pivotal mechanisms.

中文翻译：

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排队问题中的无嫉妒、团结和策略证明

摘要 给定一组代理，排队问题涉及找到为代理服务的订单以及他们应该收到的货币转移。在本文中，我们通过研究无嫉妒或团结要求的含义来描述 VCG 机制的有趣子家族。首先，我们介绍了策略证明和嫉妒自由机制的特征。接下来，我们介绍了满足成本单调性或总体单调性的两种不同公式之一的 VCG 机制的特征。最后，我们表明，在无嫉妒和策略证明机制中，唯一满足成本单调性或人口单调性两种公式之一的机制是关键或基于奖励的关键机制的扩展。