Abstract We study the constrained efficiency of a competitive entrepreneurship model that features the occupation choice between entrepreneurs and workers. It is shown that, even when (1) the only friction is uninsurable entrepreneurial risks and (2) agents are risk-averse, the competitive market can generate too many entrepreneurs. We present a sufficient statistic that determines the constrained inefficiency and its direction (whether market generates too many entrepreneurs or too few) by exploiting the unique feature of the model where the equilibrium is characterized by an indifference condition instead of a marginal condition. The framework is also pedagogically useful to understand constrained efficiency analysis at intuitive level.

中文翻译：

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竞争性创业的受限低效率

摘要 我们研究了以企业家和工人之间的职业选择为特征的竞争性创业模型的约束效率。结果表明，即使当（1）唯一的摩擦是无法投保的创业风险和（2）代理人厌恶风险时，竞争性市场也会产生过多的创业者。我们提供了一个充分的统计数据，通过利用模型的独特特征来确定受约束的无效率及其方向（市场产生的企业家太多还是太少），其中均衡以无差异条件而不是边际条件为特征。该框架在教学上也很有用，可以直观地理解受约束的效率分析。