Abstract Economic and management theory predicts that mature R&D organizations will underinvest into radical technological innovation. Recent research, however, highlights how many established R&D companies often do aggressively invest into radical innovation, but never truly reap the full benefits of their early investments. In order to investigate this paradox, we ground our paper in Agency-theory and focus on the role corporate governance plays in enabling R&D project managers and their teams to commercialize radical technologies. We use a longitudinal multi-case comparison design to examine the corporate governance systems of twelve industry-leading companies, all with a strategic mandate to commercialize radically innovative technologies on a continuing basis. Agency theory’s explanation for this puzzle is that incumbent firms struggle with radical innovation because opportunistic managers overinvest free cash flows into radical ideas, with limited commercial value. Yet, our unique access to the complete process of radical innovation shows that the challenge lies less in the middle manager’s desire to enrich themselves at the expense of the shareholders. On the contrary, it arises more from a failure to suitably select, incent and monitor the commercialization activities associated with technological innovation, the farther removed it is from the initial recognition of the opportunity.

中文翻译：

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了解成熟研发公司背景下技术经理在激进创新决策中的动机：代理理论视角

摘要 经济与管理理论预测，成熟的研发组织对激进的技术创新投资不足。然而，最近的研究强调了有多少成熟的研发公司经常积极投资于激进的创新，但从未真正从早期投资中获得全部收益。为了研究这个悖论，我们以代理理论为基础，重点关注公司治理在使研发项目经理及其团队能够将激进技术商业化方面所发挥的作用。我们使用纵向多案例比较设计来检查 12 家行业领先公司的公司治理系统，所有这些公司都肩负着持续将激进创新技术商业化的战略使命。代理理论对这个难题的解释是，现有公司在激进创新方面挣扎，因为机会主义经理将自由现金流过度投资于商业价值有限的激进想法。然而，我们对彻底创新的完整过程的独特访问表明，挑战并不在于中层管理人员以牺牲股东利益为代价来充实自己的愿望。相反，它更多地是由于未能适当地选择、激励和监控与技术创新相关的商业化活动，它与最初对机会的认识相距越远。我们对彻底创新的完整过程的独特访问表明，挑战不在于中层管理人员以牺牲股东利益为代价来充实自己的愿望。相反，它更多地是由于未能适当地选择、激励和监控与技术创新相关的商业化活动，它与最初对机会的认识相距越远。我们对彻底创新的完整过程的独特访问表明，挑战不在于中层管理人员以牺牲股东利益为代价来充实自己的愿望。相反，它更多地是由于未能适当地选择、激励和监控与技术创新相关的商业化活动，它与最初对机会的认识相距越远。