In 2005 a company in charge of repairing electric transmission towers made a deal with guerrilla militants to demolish the towers. This company thrived, because the attacks were attributed to guerrilla groups, who commit these attacks often. However, the number of attacks increased significantly, raising alarms and leading to the discovery of the plot. We model this situation as a game between contractors and the power transmission company, and show how misaligned incentives enabled contractors to profit by colluding with guerrilla groups. We also analyze how to modify the contractual policies reducing the incentives to collude with guerrillas. In particular, the transmission company can prevent attacks by creating competition and exploiting market inefficiencies.

2005年，一家负责维修输电塔的公司与游击队武装分子达成协议，拆除这些塔。该公司蒸蒸日上，因为这些攻击归因于经常进行这些攻击的游击队。但是，攻击次数大大增加，引发了警报并导致了密谋的发现。我们将这种情况建模为承包商与输电公司之间的博弈，并说明激励机制错位如何使承包商通过与游击队组织串通而获利。我们还分析了如何修改合同政策，以减少与游击队串通的动机。输电公司尤其可以通过制造竞争和利用市场低效率来防止攻击。