Abstract Electrification policies are crucial to improve the welfare of rural populations worldwide. In this context, auctions for the deployment of stand-alone solar home systems (SASHS) are an appropriate alternative to facilitate access to electricity in rural areas. The aim of this paper is to analyze the design elements and functioning of the SASHS auction in Peru in order to derive lessons for the effective and efficient design of those auctions. Based on an analytical framework developed elsewhere, this article draws on official documents and data, secondary material and interviews with stakeholders. Our results show that some design elements are particularly suitable in this regard. In contrast to renewable electricity auctions in general, for which the volume auctioned is usually set as capacity (MW) or generation (MWh), the volume of SASHS auctions should be set in terms of the number of SASHS providing an electricity service. Geographical diversity, with different auctions per region, would ensure the adoption of a minimum amount of SASHS in a given geographical area. Financial solvency, but not technical reputation, should be required. Otherwise, only the incumbents would be able to participate in the auction. The choice of technology-specific, price-only, sealed-bid, single-item auctions brings benefits in terms of economies of scale, lower support or transaction costs and a greater transparency or simplicity. A correction factor on the remuneration which accounts for the quality of the service, as applied in the Peru auction, is suitable for this type of auctions. Finally, provision of technical information, which facilitates the participation in the auction, and the implementation of a non-disclosed ceiling price are deemed appropriate. In contrast, given the low presence of local companies in the Peruvian PV market, the adoption of local content requirements would lead to higher support costs without significantly increasing the local development potential.

中文翻译：

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独立的可再生能源拍卖：秘鲁的案例

摘要 电气化政策对于改善全球农村人口的福利至关重要。在这种情况下，部署独立太阳能家庭系统 (SASHS) 的拍卖是促进农村地区电力供应的适当替代方案。本文的目的是分析秘鲁 SASHS 拍卖的设计元素和功能，以便为这些拍卖的有效和高效设计汲取经验教训。本文基于别处开发的分析框架，借鉴了官方文件和数据、二手材料以及对利益相关者的采访。我们的结果表明，一些设计元素在这方面特别合适。与一般的可再生电力拍卖相反，拍卖的数量通常设置为容量 (MW) 或发电量 (MWh)，SASHS 拍卖的数量应根据提供电力服务的 SASHS 的数量来确定。地域多样性，每个地区都有不同的拍卖，将确保在给定的地理区域采用最低数量的 SASHS。应该要求财务偿付能力，但不是技术声誉。否则，只有现任者才能参与拍卖。选择特定技术、仅限价格、密封投标、单件拍卖会带来规模经济、较低的支持或交易成本以及更大的透明度或简单性方面的好处。在秘鲁拍卖中应用的反映服务质量的报酬修正系数适用于此类拍卖。最后，提供有助于参与拍卖的技术信息，并认为实施不公开的最高限价是适当的。相比之下，鉴于秘鲁光伏市场中当地公司的存在率较低，采用当地含量要求将导致更高的支持成本，而不会显着增加当地的发展潜力。