This paper analyzes the effects of changes in aeronautical charges as brought by several airport management regimes on the air transport industry. Airlines compete on both price and non-prices variables, where connecting passengers have asymmetric valuations of flight frequencies in different legs. Changes in landing fees trigger airlines reactions on flight frequencies and airfares, whose sign depends on the weight attached to flight frequencies. Thus, an increase in the spoke landing fee leads to more international flights under low valuations of frequencies at spoke airports. Simulation exercises show that profit-maximizing aeronautical charges only at the spoke airport are preferable to those either only at the hub airport or at both airports. Welfare losses are lower when airports are granted to a unique infrastructure manager rather than to independent ones. When frequencies in the hub are highly valued, profit-maximizing charges only at the spoke airport will likely induce a welfare increase.

本文分析了几种机场管理制度对航空运输业带来的航空收费变化的影响。航空公司在价格和非价格变量上都进行竞争，其中转机的乘客对不同航段的航班频率具有不对称的估值。着陆费的变化会触发航空公司对飞行频率和票价的反应，其迹象取决于飞行频率的重量。因此，辐条着陆费的增加导致在辐条机场的频率低估下更多的国际航班。模拟演算表明，仅在辐条机场的利润最大化的航空费用比仅在枢纽机场或两个机场的费用都要高。如果将机场授予唯一的基础设施经理，而不是授予独立的基础设施经理，则福利损失会更低。当枢纽的频率得到高度重视时，仅在辐条机场收取的利润最大化费用可能会导致福利增加。