We study two districts’ voluntary co-financing of a centrally provided public good, e.g., transport infrastructure. Outcomes are compared to a surplus-maximizing level of public good provision. We show that both co-financing and lobbying raise the amount of public good provided. Co-financing and lobbying are substitutes. Co-financing (or co-financing combined with lobbying) raises the provision of the public good to a higher level than lobbying alone. Co-financing can thus reduce rent-seeking. Finally, we show that under uncertainty about district type (high or low benefit), co-financing combined with lobbying can be used to find and retain a separating equilibrium.

我们研究了两个地区对中央提供的公共物品（例如交通基础设施）的自愿联合供资。将结果与公共物品提供最大化的盈余水平进行比较。我们表明共同筹资和游说都增加了提供的公共物品的数量。共同供资和游说是替代品。与单独进行游说相比，共同筹资（或与游说相结合的共同筹资）将公共物品的提供提高到更高的水平。因此，共同筹资可以减少寻租活动。最后，我们表明，在关于地区类型（高收益或低收益）的不确定性下，联合融资与游说相结合可以用来寻找并保持分离的均衡。