In this paper, we develop a game theory model in which freight service providers seek to maximize their expected utility by competing for business from shippers and also investing in security. The focus is on high-value cargo, which has been the target of attacks globally. Shippers reflect their preferences for freight service providers through the prices they are willing to pay which depend on quantities shipped and security levels invested in. The Nash Equilibrium is formulated as a variational inequality problem for which existence is guaranteed. Numerical examples illustrate the framework and give essential freight security investment policy related information.

在本文中，我们开发了一种博弈论模型，在该模型中，货运服务提供商通过与托运人竞争业务并投资于安全性，力求最大程度地发挥其预期效用。重点是高价值货物，高价值货物已成为全球袭击的目标。托运人通过愿意支付的价格来反映他们对货运服务提供商的偏好，价格取决于运输的数量和投资的安全等级。纳什均衡被表述为可以保证存在的变分不平等问题。数值示例说明了该框架，并提供了与货运安全投资政策相关的基本信息。