This paper analyzes three travel demand management policies designed to correct the shortcomings of license plate rationing (LPR). The first policy couples LPR with a new vehicle quota scheme that directly controls auto ownership. The other two policies turn the driving permit into a tradable commodity. They differ, however, in that one policy ties the permit to the license plate while the other bestows all travelers with equal driving permits. All new policies may be viewed as “derivatives” of LPR because they share some key features: simplicity and revenue neutrality. Using a conceptual model that considers two modes (transit and driving) and user heterogeneity, we analyze user equilibrium solutions under each new policy, and for policies based on permit trading, introduce and characterize a function that links individuals' trading behavior to their value of time. Our analysis and numerical experiments show that giving tradable permits to all travelers is more efficient than the other alternatives. Under this policy, travelers who decide to own automobiles will acquire enough permits from those who do not so that the former can drive without any restriction. Consequently, the permit each traveler should receive can be easily determined from the ratio between a desired highway flow level and the total demand. Importantly, when the desired flow level equals the system optimal flow, the policy is revenue-neutral and first-best under idealized conditions.

本文分析了三种旅行需求管理策略，旨在纠正车牌配给（LPR）的缺点。第一项政策是将LPR与直接控制汽车所有权的新车辆配额方案结合在一起。其他两项政策将驾驶证变成一种可交易的商品。但是，它们的不同之处在于，一个政策将许可证与车牌联系在一起，而另一个则授予所有旅行者同等的驾驶许可证。所有新政策都可以被视为LPR的“衍生产品”，因为它们具有一些关键特征：简便性和收益中性。我们使用考虑了两种模式（运输和驾驶）和用户异质性的概念模型，分析了每种新政策下的用户均衡解决方案，并针对基于许可交易的政策，引入并描述了将个人利益联系起来的功能 交易行为取决于其时间价值。我们的分析和数值实验表明，向所有旅行者提供可交易的许可证比其他替代方案更为有效。根据这项政策，决定拥有汽车的旅行者将从那些没有汽车的旅行者那里获得足够的许可证，以便前者可以不受任何限制地驾驶。因此，可以从所需公路流量与总需求之间的比率轻松确定每个旅行者应获得的许可证。重要的是，当所需的流量水平等于系统的最佳流量时，该策略将是收入中立且在理想条件下是最佳的。决定拥有汽车的旅行者将从那些没有汽车的人那里获得足够的许可证，以便前者可以不受任何限制地驾驶。因此，可以从所需公路流量与总需求之间的比率轻松确定每个旅行者应获得的许可证。重要的是，当所需的流量水平等于系统的最佳流量时，该策略将是收入中立且在理想条件下是最佳的。决定拥有汽车的旅行者将从那些没有汽车的人那里获得足够的许可证，以便前者可以不受任何限制地驾驶。因此，可以从所需公路流量与总需求之间的比率轻松确定每个旅行者应获得的许可证。重要的是，当所需的流量水平等于系统的最佳流量时，该策略将是收入中立且在理想条件下是最佳的。