An increasing number of vehicles make spectrum resources face serious challenges in vehicular cognitive small-cell networks. The means of spectrum sharing can greatly alleviate this pressure. In this paper, we introduce a supermodular game theoretic approach to analyze the problem of spectrum sharing. The small-cell BS (primary service provider, PSP) and the vehicle (secondary service provider, SSP) can share the spectrum, where the PSP can sell idle spectrum resources to the SSP. This is taken as a spectrum trading market, and a Bertrand competition model is considered to depict this phenomenon. Different PSPs compete with each other to maximize their individual profits. The Bertrand competition model can be proved as a supermodular game, and the corresponding Nash equilibrium (NE) solution is provided as the optimal price solution. Hence, an improved genetic simulated annealing algorithm is designed to achieve NE. Simulation results demonstrate that the NE point for the price of the primary service provider exists. The change of the exogenous variable is also analyzed on the equilibrium point.

中文翻译：

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认知小蜂窝网络中的车载通信频谱共享

越来越多的车辆使频谱资源在车辆认知小蜂窝网络中面临严峻挑战。频谱共享的手段可以大大减轻这种压力。在本文中，我们介绍了一种超模博弈论方法来分析频谱共享问题。小型小区BS（主要服务提供商，PSP）和车辆（次要服务提供商，SSP）可以共享频谱，其中PSP可以将空闲频谱资源出售给SSP。这被视为频谱交易市场，并考虑了Bertrand竞争模型来描述这种现象。不同的PSP相互竞争以最大化其个人利润。可以将Bertrand竞争模型证明为超模博弈，并提供相应的纳什均衡（NE）解决方案作为最优价格解决方案。因此，设计了一种改进的遗传模拟退火算法来实现NE。仿真结果表明存在主要服务提供商价格的NE点。还在平衡点上分析了外生变量的变化。