ABSTRACT

We introduce an evolutionary dynamical model for corruption in a democratic state describing the interactions between citizens, government and officials, where the voting power of the citizens is the main mechanism to control corruption. Three main scenarios for the evolution of corruption emerge depending on the efficiency of the institutions and the social, political, and economic characteristics of the State. Efficient institutions can create a corruption intolerant self-reinforcing mechanism. The lack of political choices, weaknesses of institutions and vote buying can create a self-reinforcing mechanism of corruption. The ambition of the rulers can induce high levels of corruption that can be fought by the voting power of the citizens creating corruption cycles.

摘要

我们引入了一个民主国家腐败的演化动力学模型，描述了公民、政府和官员之间的相互作用，其中公民的投票权是控制腐败的主要机制。腐败演变的三种主要情景取决于机构的效率以及国家的社会、政治和经济特征。高效的制度可以创造一种不容忍腐败的自我强化机制。缺乏政治选择、制度薄弱和收买选票会造成腐败的自我强化机制。统治者的野心会引发高水平的腐败，而公民的投票权可以通过创造腐败循环来对抗这种腐败。