Abstract This paper compares the effectiveness of the fixed transaction fee strategy (F) and quality-based transaction fee strategy (Q) stipulated by a manufacturing capacity sharing platform in a capacity sharing supply chain (SC), considering the influence of capacity availability, quality fluctuation, and demand uncertainty. The SC is composed of a platform supplier with available capacity, a manufacturer releasing capacity request, and a platform operator. Game-theoretical models are built under both constant price and quantity discount price charged by the platform supplier to investigate decisions of the quality promise, the order quantity, the reserved quantity and the unit penalty, and the transaction fee rate. Through the comprehensive comparisons of equilibrium results in different models, the findings show that Q can incentivize the platform supplier to promise higher quality in each scenario, while F is always more profitable to the manufacturer. When the fixed transaction fee rate is within a specific range, F is a more profitable strategy for each SC member. F is more beneficial to the entire SC in all scenarios except the scenario with uncertain sufficiency of the platform supplier’s available capacity. When the available capacity is not excessive, the impact of quality fluctuation depends on the mean value of the random factor, and the demand uncertainty has no influence on the equilibrium solutions and profits; otherwise, the quality fluctuation exerts no impact on equilibrium solutions, and the influence of demand uncertainty depends on the stochastic distribution of demand. When adopting quantity discount pricing, the platform supplier will benefit from setting a relatively high initial price. The quantity discount pricing exerts no essential impact on the comparison results among different models and the coordination of the SC. This paper proposes the quality-target contract and its combination with the two-part tariff contract to achieve the coordination of SC under both F and Q in different scenarios.

中文翻译：

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固定和基于质量的交易费用策略下容量共享供应链中的决策和协调

摘要 本文比较了产能共享供应链（SC）中制造能力共享平台规定的固定交易费用策略（F）和基于质量的交易费用策略（Q）的有效性，考虑了产能可用性、质量的影响。波动，需求不确定。SC由具有可用容量的平台供应商、释放容量请求的制造商和平台运营商组成。博弈论模型是在平台供应商收取的不变价格和数量折扣价格下建立的，以研究质量承诺、订单数量、保留数量和单位罚金以及交易费率的决策。通过对不同模型均衡结果的综合比较，研究结果表明，Q 可以激励平台供应商在每种情况下承诺更高的质量，而 F 对制造商来说总是更有利可图。当固定交易费率在特定范围内时，F对于每个SC成员来说是一个更有利可图的策略。除了平台供应商的可用容量是否充足的不确定场景外，F在所有场景中都对整个SC更有利。当可用容量不超标时，质量波动的影响取决于随机因子的均值，需求不确定性对均衡解和利润没有影响；否则，质量波动对均衡解没有影响，需求不确定性的影响取决于需求的随机分布。采用数量折扣定价时，平台供应商将受益于设定相对较高的初始价格。数量折扣定价对不同模型之间的比较结果和SC的协调没有本质影响。本文提出了质量-目标合同及其与两部分资费合同的结合，以实现不同场景下F和Q下SC的协调。