Although haze risk management is mainly under government control, willingness of stakeholders is compulsory to determine. Therefore, this study constructs a tripartite game model of government, public, and enterprises and determines the haze risk evolution model considering the initial willingness of stakeholders. Moreover, numerical simulation analysis was also conducted. The results revealed that stakeholders were affected by the change due to initial willingness to participate in and reach the equilibrium at different speeds. It is found that if subsidy coefficient of the government is big, it will reach equilibrium faster. The bigger the penalty coefficient is, the better the pollution reduction effect of pollutant discharge enterprises. It is found that, at the final equilibrium stage, the government will eventually choose to withdraw from supervision, but the speed of withdrawing varies with different regulatory intentions. Study results stress that the government should actively participate in supervision to reduce environmental pollution.

中文翻译：

---

三方博弈模型降低霾风险的策略

尽管霾风险管理主要受政府控制，但必须确定利益相关者的意愿。因此，本研究构建了政府，公众和企业的三方博弈模型，并考虑了利益相关者的初始意愿来确​​定霾风险演化模型。此外，还进行了数值模拟分析。结果表明，利益相关者由于最初愿意以不同的速度参与并达到平衡而受到变化的影响。研究发现，如果政府的补贴系数较大，它将更快地达到均衡。惩罚系数越大，污染物排放企业的污染减排效果越好。发现在最终平衡阶段，政府最终将选择退出监管，但是退出的速度因监管意图的不同而不同。研究结果强调，政府应积极参与监管以减少环境污染。