The most dominant theory of human social cognition, the theory of mind hypothesis, emphasizes our ability to infer the mental states of others. After having represented the mental states of another person, however, we can also have an idea of how well our thinking aligns with theirs, and our sensitivity to this alignment may guide the flow of our social interactions. Here, we focus on the distinction between "mindreading" (inferring another's mental representation) and detecting the extent to which a represented mental state of another person is matching or mismatching with our own (mental conflict monitoring). We propose a reframing for mentalizing data of the past 40 years in terms of mental conflict monitoring rather than mental representation. Via a systematic review of 51 false belief neuroimaging studies, we argue that key brain regions implicated in false belief designs (namely, temporoparietal junction areas) may methodologically be tied to mental conflict rather than to mental representation. Patterns of false belief data suggests that autism may be tied to a subtle issue with monitoring mental conflict combined with intact mental representation, rather than to lacking mental representation abilities or "mindblindness" altogether. The consequences of this view for the larger social-cognitive domain are explored, including for perspective taking, moral judgments, and understanding irony and humor. This provides a potential shift in perspective for psychological science, its neuroscientific bases, and related disciplines: Throughout life, an adequate sensitivity to how others think differently (relational mentalizing) may be more fundamental to navigating the social world than inferring which thoughts others have (representational mentalizing). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

中文翻译：

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重塑社会认知：关系型与代表型的思维方式。

人类社会认知中最主要的理论，即心理假设理论，强调了我们推断他人心理状态的能力。但是，在代表了另一个人的精神状态之后，我们还可以对自己的思想与他们的思想保持一致的方式有所了解，而我们对这种思想的敏感性可以指导我们的社会互动的流程。在这里，我们着眼于“心念”（推断他人的心理表征）与检测他人的心理状态与我们自身的匹配或不匹配程度（心理冲突监控）之间的区别。我们建议对过去40年的数据进行心理分析，而不是心理表征进行重新定义。通过对51个错误信念神经影像学研究的系统评价，我们认为，与错误的信念设计有关的关键大脑区域（即颞顶交界处）在方法上可能与心理冲突有关，而不是与心理表征有关。错误信念数据的模式表明，自闭症可能与监测精神冲突和完整的心理表征相结合，而不是与完全缺乏心理表征能力或“头脑障碍”有关。探索了这种观点对更大范围的社会认知领域的影响，包括观点采择，道德判断以及对讽刺和幽默的理解。这为心理学，其神经科学基础和相关学科提供了潜在的视角转变：相对于推断他人的想法（代表心理），对他人如何以不同方式思考（关系心理）的充分敏感性可能对导航社会世界更为根本。（PsycInfo数据库记录（c）2020 APA，保留所有权利）。