With the development of information technology, increasing retailers cooperate with third-party payment platforms (3PPs) to provide mobile payment service for consumers. The entry of 3PPs into supply chains, not only changes the cash flow, but also decreases consumer price sensitivity and stimulates demand by facilitating credit consumptions. Moreover, information sharing becomes more feasible with the help of 3PPs. To study the impacts of 3PP entry, we build game-theoretic models in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a 3PP, and derive the equilibrium in both the non-information sharing and information sharing cases. We show that the 3PP should make a reasonable commission rate which can lure the retailer to introduce the 3PP as well as maintain the 3PP’s profitability. The 3PP entry allows the retailer to set a higher price without decreasing the demand. However, to seize all of the benefit of the 3PP entry, the first mover manufacturer increases the wholesale price to a large extent. As a result, the 3PP entry causes a win-lose situation for the manufacturer and the retailer. The supply chain can be better off from the 3PP entry if it can significantly decrease consumer price sensitivity or its fixed investment cost is low. Furthermore, we find that information sharing benefits the manufacturer and the 3PP but harms the retailer. While information sharing always decreases the expected profit for the supply chain without the 3PP, it may increase that for the supply chain with the 3PP. To improve the supply chain profitability, we suggest to provide incentives for retailer information sharing if the 3PP can significantly decrease consumer price sensitivity (i.e., the proportion of the 3PP users is higher, the grace period of credit consumption is lower, or the cash opportunity cost is lower).

中文翻译：

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移动支付、第三方支付平台接入及供应链信息共享


随着信息技术的发展，越来越多的零售商与第三方支付平台（3PP）合作，为消费者提供移动支付服务。 3PP进入供应链，不仅改变了现金流，还降低了消费者价格敏感度，通过促进信贷消费刺激需求。此外，在 3PP 的帮助下，信息共享变得更加可行。为了研究 3PP 进入的影响，我们在由制造商、零售商和 3PP 组成的供应链中建立博弈论模型，并得出非信息共享和信息共享情况下的均衡。我们表明3PP应该制定合理的佣金率，既可以吸引零售商引入3PP，又可以维持3PP的盈利能力。 3PP 条目允许零售商在不减少需求的情况下设定更高的价格。然而，为了抢占3PP进入的全部利益，先发厂商大幅提高了批发价格。结果，3PP进入导致制造商和零售商双输。如果3PP进入能够显着降低消费者价格敏感度或其固定投资成本较低，那么供应链就会受益匪浅。此外，我们发现信息共享对制造商和 3PP 有利，但对零售商不利。虽然信息共享总是会降低没有 3PP 的供应链的预期利润，但它可能会增加有 3PP 的供应链的预期利润。为了提高供应链盈利能力，如果3PP能够显着降低消费者价格敏感性（即，3PP用户比例越高，信用消费宽限期越低，或现金机会成本越低）。