Abstract This paper explores market selection in general equilibrium when the state of the economy is endogenous. Analysis of consumer survival in this case requires solution of the model’s dynamics, for which evolutionary game theory can be useful; for instance, if the state and beliefs are Markovian and utility logarithmic, then the dynamics of consumption shares are described by the replicator dynamics. This is illustrated in a simple exchange economy, and in a standard monetary economy with multiple long-run equilibria where a plausible form of inflation targeting serves to destabilize a liquidity trap in favor of the target equilibrium.

中文翻译：

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具有内生状态的市场选择

摘要 本文探讨了当经济状况是内生的时一般均衡下的市场选择。在这种情况下对消费者生存的分析需要解决模型的动力学问题，进化博弈论对此很有用；例如，如果状态和信念是马尔可夫和效用对数的，则消费份额的动态由复制器动态描述。这在简单的交换经济和具有多个长期均衡的标准货币经济中得到了说明，其中合理的通胀目标形式有助于破坏流动性陷阱，有利于目标均衡。