Abstract This paper examines optimal lending contracts between a single not-for-profit lender and a continuum of risk-averse borrowers, where the lending relationships are continually created and destroyed. The lender self-finances its costs via income from loans, while borrowers can walk away from the current relationship in any period and search for a new relationship. We characterize the optimal allocation by formulating the lender’s problem of maximizing social welfare and by resorting to a variational argument that takes into account the limited commitment problem and the endogenous outside option values of the borrowers. In the benchmark case of the Benthamite social welfare function, we find that the optimal stationary allocation exhibits novel consumption dynamics: Borrower consumption begins at a relatively low level, converges toward a particular level when the participation constraint is slack, and jumps up when the participation constraint binds. We then explore the role of limited commitment in generating such consumption dynamics and discuss the associated repayment profile.

中文翻译：

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当借款人具有风险规避和有限承诺时的最优自筹小额信贷合同

摘要 本文研究了单个非营利贷款人与一系列风险厌恶借款人之间的最优贷款合同，其中贷款关系不断地被创造和破坏。贷方通过贷款收入自筹成本，而借款人可以在任何时期摆脱当前的关系并寻找新的关系。我们通过制定贷款人最大化社会福利的问题和诉诸变分论证来描述最优分配，该论证考虑了有限承诺问题和借款人的内生外部期权价值。在 Benthamite 社会福利函数的基准案例中，我们发现最优平稳分配表现出新的消费动态：借款人消费开始于相对较低的水平，当参与约束松弛时向特定水平收敛，并在参与约束绑定时向上跳跃。然后，我们探讨有限承诺在产生这种消费动态中的作用，并讨论相关的还款情况。