Two players strike balances between allocating resources for defense and production of zero-day exploits. Production is further allocated into cyberattack or stockpiling. Applying the Cobb Douglas expected utility function for equivalent players, an analytical solution is determined where each player’s expected utility is inverse U shaped in each player’s unit defense cost. More generally, simulations illustrate the impact of varying nine parameter values relative to a benchmark. Increasing a player’s unit costs of defense or development of zero-days benefits the opposing player. Increasing the contest intensities over the two players’ assets causes the players to increase their efforts until their resources are fully exploited and they receive zero expected utility. Decreasing the Cobb Douglas output elasticity for a player’s stockpiling of zero-days causes its attack to increase and its expected utility to eventually reach a maximum, while the opposing player’s expected utility reaches a minimum. Altering the Cobb Douglas output elasticities for a player’s attack or defense contests towards their maxima or minima causes maximum expected utility for both players.

在为防御分配资源和生产零日漏洞的过程中，有两个参与者之间达到了平衡。生产被进一步分配到网络攻击或库存中。将Cobb Douglas预期效用函数应用于等效的球员，可以确定分析解决方案，其中每个球员的预期效用在每个球员的单位防御成本中为U形倒数。更一般而言，仿真说明了相对于基准线改变九个参数值的影响。增加队员的防守或零日发展的单位成本会使对方队员受益。在两个玩家的资产上增加比赛强度会导致玩家加大努力，直到他们的资源被充分利用且预期效用为零。球员零日储备的降低Cobb Douglas输出弹性会导致其进攻增加，其预期效用最终达到最大值，而对方球员的预期效用达到最小值。将Cobb Douglas的输出弹性更改为球员的进攻或防守比赛时的最大或最小值，会导致两个球员的预期效用最大化。