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Dynamic Analysis of Duopoly Price Game Based on Low-Carbon Technology Sharing
Mathematical Problems in Engineering ( IF 1.430 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-04 , DOI: 10.1155/2020/3832571
Fengshan Si 1 , Zhengkun Yan 2 , Jing Wang 1 , Daoming Dai 1
Affiliation  

Taking the carbon emissions per unit product as the standard to measure the low-carbon technology level of the enterprise, this article analyzed how the technology supplier enterprises realize low-carbon production and achieve a win-win situation for both supply and demand through technology sharing through technology research and development. Based on the positive effect of low-carbon technology level on product demand, we studied the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal low-carbon technology level in the technology supply enterprises under the Stackelberg game in 3 conditions (i.e., without technology research and development or technology sharing, with technology research and development but no technology sharing, and with both technology research and development and technology sharing). We also drew a comparative analysis of the optimal product price, the optimal low-carbon technology level, and the optimal profit in the three scenarios. Besides, by constructing a delayed differential price game model, we studied the equilibrium strategy of price competition between technology supply and demand companies and the local asymptotic stability of the game system at the equilibrium point. In addition, the effects of delay strategy on game equilibrium strategy, the influence of the degree of adjustment of decision variables on the stability of the game system, and the stability of the game system on the evolution trend of the game are also explored. By comparing and analyzing the game results of the oligopoly enterprises in the stable system and the unstable system, it confirmed that the system instability usually causes serious harm to the enterprise.

中文翻译:

基于低碳技术共享的双头垄断价格博弈动态分析

本文以单位产品的碳排放量为标准来衡量企业的低碳技术水平,分析了技术供应商企业如何通过技术共享实现低碳生产,实现供需双赢。通过技术研发。基于低碳技术水平对产品需求的积极影响,我们研究了Stackelberg博弈下3种条件下(即没有技术研发或无技术条件下)技术供应企业的最优定价策略和最优低碳技术水平。技术共享,包括技术研发,但没有技术共享,以及技术研发和技术共享)。我们还对三种情况下的最佳产品价格,最佳低碳技术水平和最佳利润进行了比较分析。此外,通过构建时滞差分价格博弈模型,研究了技术供求公司之间价格竞争的均衡策略和均衡点博弈系统的局部渐近稳定性。此外,还探讨了延迟策略对博弈均衡策略的影响,决策变量调整程度对博弈系统稳定性的影响以及博弈系统稳定性对博弈演化趋势的影响。通过比较和分析稳定系统和不稳定系统中的寡头企业的博弈结果,
更新日期:2020-09-05
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