Reviewed by:

• The Origins of American Strategic Bombing Theory by Craig Morris
• Jeremy Black (bio)

A valuable contribution to a crowded field, Craig Morris’s ably researched and well-written book builds on the work of major scholars, notably Tami Davis Biddle, Mark Clodfelter, Stephen McFarland, and John Buckley, to argue that American strategic bombing doctrine stemmed from an interaction among airpower theory, aircraft technology, organizational dynamics, and political forces. Morris, assistant professor of history at the U.S. Air Force Academy, emphasizes external factors rather than the Air Corps and focuses on the 1926 Air Corps Act as the turning point for strategic bombing. He suggests that the concept of strategic bombing was poorly developed, not least due to the lack of a defensive national security policy, combined with funding and technological issues.

Deliberately embracing the complexity of reality and subverting the standard teleology, Morris argues that the late 1930s was not a period of triumph for strategic bombing. The army was more interested in developing its conventional components. Thus, the General Staff under Malin Craig, the army’s Chief of Staff from 1935 to 1939, was opposed to the B-17, as was the navy. Two aircraft companies had developed gigantic long-range bombers: Boeing, with the XB-15, an aircraft designed in 1934 and first flown in 1937; and Douglas, with the XBLR (Experimental Bomber Long Range)-2, renumbered the Douglas B-19, contracted in 1938 and first flown in 1941, was named the “Hemisphere Defender,” as part of the air force’s XBLR program. The specifications for the XB-15 were for an aircraft capable of carrying 2,000 pounds (910 kilograms) at 200 mph (320 kmh) over a distance of 5,000 miles (8,000 kilometers). The aircraft used an autopilot and de-icing equipment. Its speed, however, when loaded with 2,000 pounds, was only 145 mph, which was too slow for a combat mission, and the project was abandoned. [End Page 970]

Success came with the B-17, the Flying Fortress, the first effective all-metal, four-engine monoplane bomber, seen as an expression of American power. “Airpower you could put your hands on,” according to General Henry Arnold, the B-17 had an initial range of 2,600 miles and a top speed of 250 mph. The General Staff, however, preferred a less expensive medium bomber, better able to provide ground support. The B-17 was presented as extending America’s coastal perimeter by being able to attack an incoming fleet well out to sea, in other words a form of mobile coastal fortress, not a strategic bomber. Despite its relatively small bomb load and unsuitability for night attacks, the B-17 was nevertheless forced into that role in the forthcoming world war.

It was the onset of German militarism from 1938 that helped lead to a focus on aircraft, with President Roosevelt playing a key role. He was supported in this from 1939 by his Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, who established that year the Army Air Forces. This new organization proved more adroit at command and planning than in the previous more inchoate situation. In turn, the Air Corps analysts, exaggerating the effectiveness of the German Luftwaffe, put failure in 1940 down to a lack of strategic bombers, thus underplaying the role of the British integrated air-defense system. In July 1941, Air War Plans Division No. 1 appeared to offer a comprehensive plan for defeating Germany by means of air power. The right opponent had helped push forward both the doctrine and the crucial support.

This is an interesting book, although the author offers very little indeed on the challenge from Japan, against which B-17s were deployed to Clark Field in the Philippines in 1941.

Jeremy Black is professor of history at the University of Exeter, U.K. His books include Beyond the Military Revolution (Macmillan, 2011), War and Technology (Indiana University Press, 2013), and Airpower: A Global History (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

审核人：

• 克雷格·莫里斯（Craig Morris）的美国战略轰炸理论的起源
• 杰里米·布莱克（生物）

克雷格·莫里斯（Craig Morris）的著作经过精心研究和写成，对拥挤的领域做出了宝贵的贡献，这些著作的主要作者是塔米·戴维斯·比德尔（Tami Davis Biddle），马克·克洛德费尔特（Mark Clodfelter），斯蒂芬·麦克法兰（Stephen McFarland）和约翰·巴克利（John Buckley）等主要学者，他们认为美国的战略轰炸学说源于空中力量理论，飞机技术，组织动力和政治力量之间的相互作用。美国空军学院历史学助理教授莫里斯（Morris）强调外部因素而不是空军，并着眼于1926年空军法令作为战略轰炸的转折点。他建议战略轰炸的概念发展不佳，这尤其是由于缺乏防御性的国家安全政策以及资金和技术问题。

莫里斯故意拥抱现实的复杂性并颠覆了标准目的论，他认为1930年代后期不是战略轰炸的胜利时期。陆军对开发常规部件更感兴趣。因此，1935年至1939年陆军参谋长马林·克雷格（Malin Craig）领导的总参谋部与海军一样反对B-17。两家飞机公司开发了巨大的远程轰炸机：波音公司的XB-15型飞机于1934年设计，1937年首飞；道格拉斯（Douglas）用XBLR（实验轰炸机远程）-2重新编号为道格拉斯B-19，该飞机于1938年签订合同，于1941年首次飞行，被命名为“半球防御者”，是空军XBLR计划的一部分。XB-15的规格适用于能够搭载2架，在5,000英里（8,000公里）的距离上，以200英里/小时（320公里/小时）的速度承受000磅（910千克）的重量。该飞机使用了自动驾驶仪和除冰设备。但是，当载有2,000磅重时，它的速度仅为145 mph，对于战斗任务来说太慢了，该项目被放弃了。[结束页970]

B-17飞行堡垒取得了成功，这是第一个有效的全金属，四引擎单翼轰炸机，被视为美国力量的体现。亨利·阿诺德将军说：“您可以放下空中力量，” B-17的初始航程为2,600英里，最高时速为250 mph。但是，总参谋部更喜欢价格便宜的中型轰炸机，它能够提供地面支援。B-17的出现是为了扩展美国的沿海范围，因为它能够攻击即将到来的舰队到海中，换句话说，是一种流动的沿海堡垒，而不是战略轰炸机。尽管B-17的炸弹负荷相对较小且不适合进行夜间袭击，但在即将到来的世界大战中，B-17被迫扮演这种角色。

正是由于1938年德国军国主义的爆发，导致了人们对飞机的关注，罗斯福总统发挥了关键作用。从1939年起，他的陆军参谋长乔治·马歇尔（George Marshall）为此提供了支持，他于当年建立了陆军空军。这个新组织在指挥和计划上比以前更早期的情况更加熟练。反过来，空军军官的分析家夸大了德国空军的效能，将1940年的失败归结为缺乏战略轰炸机，从而削弱了英国综合防空系统的作用。1941年7月，空战计划第一师似乎提出了通过空中力量击败德国的全面计划。正确的对手帮助推动了该学说和至关重要的支持。

这是一本有趣的书，尽管作者几乎没有提供来自日本的挑战，1941年日本将B-17部署到菲律宾的克拉克菲尔德。

杰里米·布莱克（Jeremy Black）是英国埃克塞特大学历史教授，他的著作包括《超越军事革命》（麦克米伦，2011年），《战争与技术》（印第安纳大学出版社，2013年）和《空中力量：全球历史》（Rowman＆Littlefield，2016年）。 。