Abstract In recent years, the big data discriminatory pricing (BDDP) behavior of the service platform has recurrently appeared in the platform service supply chain, which is considered as a scandal that is irresponsible to the consumers. Therefore, how to effectively govern the service platform has become an important research topic. Based on this background, this study considers the strategies of the service platform, the government and the consumers, builds a three-party evolutionary game model, and puts forward a governance mechanism for preventing the service platform from using BDDP. this study has drawn many interesting conclusions. First, when the service platform is risk-neutral, if the government does not supervise the platform, the government should set a high tax rate; conversely, if the government chooses to supervise the platform, the tax rate can remain unchanged, and the government can set a high penalty. Second, considering the risk aversion of the platform, if the government does not supervise, not only high tax rate but also low tax rate will be effective; the specific value of the tax rate at this time is determined by the risk aversion factor. When platforms are supervised by the government, a high penalty can be imposed, but the penalty may decrease as the platform risk aversion factor increases. Third, in situations in which the government has no incentive for long-term supervision since the supervision cost is greater than the supervision revenue, the service platform has the incentive to carry out BDDP and consumers do not give the service platform bad evaluations, if the government sets a high penalty, the service platform will recurrently, but not always, carry out BDDP.

中文翻译：

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平台服务供应链大数据歧视性定价行为如何治理？三方演化博弈模型检验

摘要 近年来，服务平台的大数据歧视性定价（BDDP）行为在平台服务供应链中反复出现，被视为对消费者不负责任的丑闻。因此，如何有效治理服务平台成为一个重要的研究课题。基于此背景，本研究综合考虑服务平台、政府和消费者的策略，构建三方演化博弈模型，提出防止服务平台使用BDDP的治理机制。这项研究得出了许多有趣的结论。第一，当服务平台是风险中性的，如果政府不监管平台，政府应该设置高税率；相反，如果政府选择监管平台，税率可以保持不变，政府可以设置高额罚款。其次，考虑到平台的风险规避，如果政府不监管，不仅高税率有效，低税率也有效；此时税率的具体数值由风险规避系数决定。当平台受政府监管时，可以处以高额罚款，但随着平台风险规避因素的增加，罚款可能会减少。第三，在政府因监管成本大于监管收入而没有激励长期监管的情况下，服务平台有动机进行BDDP，消费者不给服务平台差评，如果政府定高额罚款，服务平台会反复，但不总是，