To explore the incentive mechanisms of cooperation, inspired by preference for reputation in indirect reciprocity and the influence of behavioral observability on fitness, we present a new rewarding mechanism by incorporating these two impact factors into the evaluation of fitness in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game (PDG), under which a dynamically changing reward is established for cooperative neighbors whose reputation is higher than the average score of all neighbors. Simulation results reveal that the proposed rewarding mechanism favors the evolution of cooperation, under the joint effects of behavioral observability and reputational preference, cooperators can gradually agglomerate and form close clusters to defend the invasion of defectors. Moreover, we have investigated the characteristic snapshots and strategy transitions during the evolutionary process, which further validate the above outcome.

中文翻译：

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行为可观察性和基于声誉偏好的奖励机制促进空间社会困境中的合作

为了探索合作的激励机制，受间接互惠中对信誉的偏好以及行为可观察性对适应性的影响的启发，我们通过将这两个影响因素纳入空间囚徒困境博弈（PDG）的适应性评估中，提出了一种新的奖励机制。 ），根据这种信誉，声誉高于所有邻居平均得分的合作邻居将获得动态变化的奖励。仿真结果表明，所提出的报酬机制有利于合作的发展，在行为可观察性和声誉偏好的共同作用下，合作者可以逐渐凝聚并形成紧密的集群，以防御叛逃者的入侵。此外，