Construction activities are notorious for their negative environmental impacts. To obtain environmental legitimacy, some construction contractors tend to adopt greenwashing behaviors (GWBs). As yet, the formation mechanism of contractor GWBs is unclear, which results in tremendous pressures on government regulations. GWBs are viewed as contractors’ adaptation to the institutional environment and stem from the interactions among contractors, internal project supervisors, and external regulators. Drawing on the institutional theory, this study adopts a two-stage game theory perspective to explore these interactions and examines how environmental regulations influence the internal supervisory process and information transmission. A series of equilibriums and a validation case study of a city megaproject are presented. This study suggests that insufficient government regulation capacity triggers contractor GWBs in terms of both environmental behaviors and communication. On this basis, several governance strategies are calibrated. The results indicate that the “dishonesty list disclosure” and “unified green certification” are effective in preventing GWBs and these strategies only work with sufficient government regulation capacity. The provision of government penalties and green subsidies might not be as powerful. This study provides a theoretical basis for aligning contractor GWBs prevention strategies and sheds new light on sustainable governance in the built environment.

建设活动因其负面的环境影响而臭名昭著。为了获得环境合法性，一些建筑承包商倾向于采用绿色清洗行为（GWB）。迄今为止，承包商GWB的形成机制尚不清楚，这给政府法规带来了巨大压力。GWB被视为承包商对机构环境的适应，源于承包商，内部项目主管和外部监管者之间的相互作用。本研究借鉴制度理论，从两阶段博弈论的角度探讨了这些相互作用，并考察了环境法规如何影响内部监督过程和信息传递。提出了一系列均衡和城市大型项目的验证案例研究。这项研究表明，政府监管能力不足会在环境行为和沟通方面引发承包商GWB。在此基础上，对几种治理策略进行了校准。结果表明，“不诚实名单披露”和“统一的绿色认证”可以有效地预防GWB，这些策略仅在具有足够的政府监管能力的情况下有效。提供政府罚款和绿色补贴可能没有那么强大。这项研究为调整承包商GWB的预防策略提供了理论依据，并为建筑环境中的可持续治理提供了新的思路。结果表明，“不诚实名单披露”和“统一的绿色认证”可以有效地预防GWB，这些策略仅在具有足够的政府监管能力的情况下有效。提供政府罚款和绿色补贴可能没有那么强大。这项研究为调整承包商GWB的预防策略提供了理论依据，并为建筑环境中的可持续治理提供了新的思路。结果表明，“不诚实名单披露”和“统一的绿色认证”可以有效地预防GWB，这些策略仅在具有足够的政府监管能力的情况下有效。提供政府罚款和绿色补贴可能没有那么强大。这项研究为调整承包商GWB的预防策略提供了理论依据，并为建筑环境中的可持续治理提供了新的思路。