This paper explains the performance outcomes of markets for technology. It examines whether, and in what context, licensing agreements function as signals of innovativeness that influence investors' evaluation of public companies and if they are consistent ex post the announcement. Joining the literature on markets for technology and signalling theory, it distinguishes the outcomes related to the expectation and the confirmation of the signal, while investigating the context in terms of a company's analyst coverage. This distinction is addressed based on an empirical strategy that draws on a sample of 99 companies (2006–2012) and relates the investing community's reaction to both abnormal stock market returns in the day of the announcement and to Tobin's q one year after. The results show neither immediate nor ex post effects for outward agreements, and negative immediate and ex post effects for inward agreements, which are muted for companies with extensive analyst coverage. They thus suggest that inward licenses are relevant negative signals and that the value of signals is maintained across time horizons. Our theory development introduces analyst coverage as a contingency under which licensing agreements represent a weaker signal. Our research thus warns managers against publicly announcing their licensing strategies.

本文解释了技术市场的绩效结果。它检查许可协议是否以及在何种情况下起到创新信号的作用，从而影响投资者对上市公司的评估，以及它们在公告发布后是否一致。结合技术和信号理论市场的文献，它区分了与预期和信号确认相关的结果，同时根据公司的分析师覆盖范围调查了背景情况。这种区别是基于经验策略来解决的，该策略采用了99家公司（2006-2012年）的样本，并将投资群体对公告发布之日的异常股票市场收益和一年后的托宾q的反应联系在一起。结果显示，既没有对外协议的立即或事后影响，也没有对内部协议的即时和事后负面影响，这对于具有广泛分析师覆盖范围的公司而言，是没有作用的。因此，他们建议，内向许可证是相关的负面信号，并且信号的价值在整个时间范围内都得到保持。我们的理论发展引入了分析师报道作为一种偶然情况，在这种情况下，许可协议代表了一个较弱的信号。因此，我们的研究警告管理人员不要公开宣布其许可策略。我们的理论发展引入了分析师报道作为一种偶然情况，在这种情况下，许可协议代表了一个较弱的信号。因此，我们的研究警告管理人员不要公开宣布其许可策略。我们的理论发展引入了分析师报道作为一种偶然情况，在这种情况下，许可协议代表了一个较弱的信号。因此，我们的研究警告管理人员不要公开宣布其许可策略。