Motivated by the design and optimization of the water exchange networks in Eco-Industrial Parks (EIP), we investigate the abstract Blind-Input model for general exchange networks. This abstract model is based on a Game Theory approach, formulating it as a Single-Leader-Multi-Follower (SLMF) game: at the upper level, there is an authority (leader) that aims to minimize the consumption of natural resources, while, at the lower level, agents (followers) try to minimize their operating costs. We introduce the notion of Blind-Input contract, which is an economic contract between the authority and the agents in order to ensure the participation of the latter ones in the exchange networks. More precisely, when participating in the exchange network, each agent accepts to have a blind input in the sense that she controls only her output fluxes, and the authority commits to guarantee a minimal relative improvement in comparison with the agent’s stand-alone operation. The SLMF game is equivalently transformed into a single mixed-integer optimization problem. Thanks to this reformulation, examples of EIP of realistic size are then studied numerically.

出于对生态工业园区（EIP）中水交换网络的设计和优化的推动，我们研究了通用交换网络的抽象盲输入模型。这个抽象模型基于博弈论方法，将其表述为单领导者多跟随者（SLMF）游戏：在较高级别上，有一个旨在最小化自然资源消耗的权限（领导者），而，在较低的级别，代理（追随者）试图将其运营成本降至最低。我们引入盲输入契约的概念，这是权威机构与代理之间的经济契约，以确保后者与交易网络的参与。更准确地说，当参与交换网络时，每个代理都接受盲输入，即她仅控制自己的输出流量，并且授权机构承诺与代理程序的独立操作相比，保证相对最小的改进。SLMF游戏等效地转换为单个混合整数优化问题。由于有了这样的重新设计，因此可以对具有实际大小的EIP的示例进行数值研究。