In the 70 years since Alan Turing’s ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ appeared in Mind, there have been two widely-accepted interpretations of the Turing test: the canonical behaviourist interpretation and the rival inductive or epistemic interpretation. These readings are based on Turing’s Mind paper; few seem aware that Turing described two other versions of the imitation game. I have argued that both readings are inconsistent with Turing’s 1948 and 1952 statements about intelligence, and fail to explain the design of his game. I argue instead for a response-dependence interpretation (Proudfoot 2013). This interpretation has implications for Turing’s view of free will: I argue that Turing’s writings suggest a new form of free will compatibilism, which I call response-dependence compatibilism (Proudfoot 2017a). The philosophical implications of rethinking Turing’s test go yet further. It is assumed by numerous theorists that Turing anticipated the computational theory of mind. On the contrary, I argue, his remarks on intelligence and free will lead to a new objection to computationalism.

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重新思考图灵测试及其哲学含义

自从艾伦·图灵的《计算机与智能》出现在 Mind 的 70 年里，对图灵测试有两种被广泛接受的解释：规范行为主义解释和对立的归纳或认知解释。这些读数基于图灵的思想论文；似乎很少有人知道图灵描述了模仿游戏的另外两个版本。我认为这两种解读都与图灵 1948 年和 1952 年关于智力的陈述不一致，并且未能解释他的游戏设计。相反，我主张对响应依赖的解释（Proudfoot 2013）。这种解释对图灵的自由意志观点有影响：我认为图灵的著作提出了一种新形式的自由意志相容论，我称之为响应依赖相容论（Proudfoot 2017a）。重新思考图灵测试的哲学含义更进一步。许多理论家假设图灵预见了心智的计算理论。相反，我认为，他关于智能和自由意志的评论导致了对计算主义的新反对。