Abstract In this paper we consider an on-demand service platform connecting self-scheduling service providers with heterogeneous and congestion-sensitive customers. Based on the congestion sensitivity, customers are classified into two types. Two pricing strategies are proposed for the platform to classify the customers. We develop a model that can capture customer heterogeneous with different congestion sensitivities, in which the optimal strategies are analyzed and compared for the platform. In addition, we compare this model with the unclassified model without customer congestion-sensitivity heterogeneity from the perspective of all participants and the whole society. We show that it does not always benefit the platform to serve as many customers as possible, and the platform should switch between the two strategies according to market conditions. When the potential supply is scare, the potential demand is sufficient, the proportion of low congestion-sensitivity customers is high, or the sensitivity difference between two types of customers is significant, the platform should adopt the strategy serving only one type of customers rather than the whole market. Furthermore, we observe that, the classified model always brings more profit, consumer surplus and social welfare than the unclassified one, although it sometimes hurts the agents’ labor welfare.

中文翻译：

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具有异构拥塞敏感客户的按需服务平台的定价和工资策略

摘要 在本文中，我们考虑了一个按需服务平台，它将自调度服务提供商与异构和拥塞敏感的客户连接起来。根据拥塞敏感性，客户分为两种类型。平台提出了两种定价策略来对客户进行分类。我们开发了一个模型，可以捕获具有不同拥塞敏感性的客户异构，其中分析和比较平台的最佳策略。此外，我们从所有参与者和整个社会的角度，将该模型与没有客户拥塞敏感性异质性的未分类模型进行了比较。我们表明，为尽可能多的客户提供服务并不总是有益于平台，平台应根据市场情况在两种策略之间切换。当潜在供应稀缺、潜在需求充足、低拥塞敏感度客户比例高或两类客户敏感性差异显着时，平台应采取只服务一类客户的策略整个市场。此外，我们观察到，分类模型总是比未分类模型带来更多的利润、消费者剩余和社会福利，尽管它有时会损害代理人的劳动福利。平台应该采取只服务于一种客户而不是整个市场的策略。此外，我们观察到，分类模型总是比未分类模型带来更多的利润、消费者剩余和社会福利，尽管它有时会损害代理人的劳动福利。平台应该采取只服务于一种客户而不是整个市场的策略。此外，我们观察到，分类模型总是比未分类模型带来更多的利润、消费者剩余和社会福利，尽管它有时会损害代理人的劳动福利。