Safety inspection is an important ways to secure the safe production of coal mining enterprises. A host of scholars to date have focused on studying the safety inspection from the traditional game theory point of view, which is not consistent with the actual situation in terms of the assumptions of “fully rational participants” and “symmetric information”. Furthermore, the long-term dynamic game analysis under bounded rationality has not been considered. Therefore, in view of the insufficiency of the above mentioned research, this paper analyses the state inspection behaviour for coal mine safety from the perspective of an evolutionary game and combines the system dynamics (SD) with the concept of dynamic evolution to model and analyse the above long-term dynamic game process. The results show that there are three scenarios of the evolutionary game behaviour and two evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), and ESSs are closely related to the inspection cost, bribes, rewards, expected image loss, coal enterprise penalty, and the National Coal Mine Safety Administration (NCMSA) penalty. Furthermore, decreasing the bribes or inspection cost or increasing the rewards, image loss, coal enterprise penalty, or NCMSA penalty would help the NCMSA conscientiously perform its inspection functions.

安全检查是保障煤矿企业安全生产的重要途径。迄今为止，许多学者从传统博弈论的角度研究安全检查，这与“完全理性的参与者”和“对称信息”的假设与实际情况不一致。此外，还没有考虑有限理性下的长期动态博弈分析。因此，鉴于上述研究的不足，本文从演化博弈的角度分析了煤矿安全的状态检查行为，并将系统动力学（SD）与动态演化的概念相结合，对煤矿安全进行了建模和分析。以上是长期动态的游戏过程。结果表明，存在三种演化博弈行为场景和两种演化稳定策略（ESS），而ESS与检查成本，贿赂，奖励，预期形象损失，煤炭企业罚款和国家煤矿安全密切相关。管理（NCMSA）罚款。此外，减少贿赂或检查费用或增加奖励，图像损失，煤炭企业罚款或NCMSA罚款将有助于NCMSA认真履行其检查职能。