A set of assertions is consistent provided they can all be true at the same time. Naive individuals could prove consistency using the formal rules of a logical calculus, but it calls for them to fail to prove the negation of one assertion from the remainder in the set. An alternative procedure is for them to use an intuitive system (System 1) to construct a mental model of all the assertions. The task should be easy in this case. However, some sets of consistent assertions have no intuitive models and call for a deliberative system (System 2) to construct an alternative model. Formal rules and mental models therefore make different predictions. We report three experiments that tested their respective merits. The participants assessed the consistency of temporal descriptions based on statements using “during” and “before.” They were more accurate for consistent problems with intuitive models than for those that called for deliberative models. There was no robust difference in accuracy between consistent and inconsistent problems. The results therefore corroborated the model theory.

一组断言是一致的，前提是它们可以同时为真。天真的个人可以使用逻辑演算的形式规则来证明一致性，但这要求他们不能从集合中的其余部分证明一个断言的否定。另一种方法是让他们使用直观系统（系统 1）来构建所有断言的心智模型。在这种情况下，任务应该很容易。然而，一些一致的断言集没有直观的模型，需要一个审议系统（系统 2）来构建一个替代模型。因此，形式规则和心智模型会做出不同的预测。我们报告了三个测试各自优点的实验。参与者根据使用“during”和“before”的陈述来评估时间描述的一致性。”与那些需要协商模型的问题相比，它们对于具有直观模型的一致问题更准确。一致问题和不一致问题之间的准确性没有明显差异。因此，结果证实了模型理论。