Abstract: In this paper a game-theoretical model with self-interest pursuing consumers is introduced in order to assess how to design a least-cost distribution tariff under two constraints that regulators typically face. The first constraint is related to difficulties regarding the implementation of cost-reflective tariffs. In practice, so-called cost-reflective tariffs are only a proxy for the actual cost driver(s) in distribution grids. The second constraint has to do with fairness. There is a fear that active consumers investing in distributed energy resources (DER) might benefit at the expense of passive consumers. We find that both constraints have a significant impact on the least-cost network tariff design, and the results depend on the state of the grid. If most of the grid investments still have to be made, passive and active consumers can both benefit from cost-reflective tariffs, while this is not the case for passive consumers if the costs are mostly sunk.

中文翻译：

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低成本配电网电价设计的理论与实践

摘要：本文介绍了一种具有自利追求消费者的博弈模型，目的是评估如何在监管者通常面临的两个约束条件下设计最低成本的分销关税。第一个约束条件与实施成本反射型关税有关的困难有关。实际上，所谓的“成本反射型关税”仅是配电网中实际成本驱动因素的替代。第二个约束与公平有关。人们担心，积极的消费者投资分布式能源（DER）可能会以消极的消费者为代价而受益。我们发现这两个约束对最低成本的网络资费设计有重大影响，其结果取决于网格的状态。如果仍然需要进行大部分电网投资，