This paper quantifies a tenant-side “split incentives” problem that exists when the largest commercial sector customers are on electricity-included property lease contracts causing them to face a marginal electricity price of zero. We use exogenous variation in weather shocks to show that the largest firms on tenant-paid contracts use up to 14 percent less electricity in response to summer temperature fluctuations. The result is retrieved under weaker identifying assumptions than previous split incentives papers, and is robust when exposed to several opportunities to fail. The electricity reduction in response to temperature increases is likely to be a lower bound when generalized nationwide and suggests that policymakers should consider a sub-metering policy to expose the largest commercial tenants to the prevailing retail electricity price.

中文翻译：

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包括的公用事业：商业电力合同中的分割激励

本文量化了当最大的商业部门客户签订含电物业租赁合同导致他们面临边际电价为零时存在的租户方“分裂激励”问题。我们使用天气冲击的外生变化来表明，为应对夏季温度波动，签订租户付费合同的最大公司的用电量最多可减少 14%。结果是在比以前的拆分激励论文更弱的识别假设下检索到的，并且在面临多个失败机会时是稳健的。在全国范围内推广时，因温度升高而导致的电力减少可能是一个下限，并建议政策制定者考虑分计量政策，使最大的商业租户承受现行零售电价。