In the previous study, authors proved that inversion of enhanced matrix power function (MPF), introduced as conjectured one-way function, is a nondeterministic polynomial time (NP)-complete problem. Furthermore, a key agreement protocol (KAP), the security of which relies on the inversion of this function, was previously proposed. The problem is that the application of MPF can yield weak keys under the linearisation attack. In this study, the authors perform a security analysis of the proposed KAP and give recommendations to avoid weak keys. Their method relies on the conjecture that enhanced MPF is an almost one-to-one function when entries of power matrices are bound to a certain range. Their result is a security parameter definition and its secure value determination using numerical simulation. On the basis of the obtained result, they estimate memory requirements for storing public parameter and keys.

中文翻译：

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基于增强型MPF的KAP安全性分析

在先前的研究中，作者证明了作为猜想单向函数引入的增强矩阵幂函数（MPF）的求逆是一个不确定的多项式时间（NP）完全问题。此外，先前提出了密钥协商协议（KAP），其安全性依赖于该功能的反转。问题在于MPF的应用在线性化攻击下会产生弱密钥。在这项研究中，作者对提出的KAP进行了安全性分析，并提出了避免弱密钥的建议。他们的方法基于这样的猜想：当幂矩阵的项绑定到某个范围时，增强的MPF几乎是一对一的函数。他们的结果是安全参数定义及其使用数值模拟的安全值确定。根据获得的结果，