Abstract This paper analyses a two-player stopping game with multiarmed bandits in which each player chooses between learning about the quality of her private risky arm and competing for the use of a single shared safe arm. The qualities of the players’ risky arms are independent. A player whose risky arm produces a success no longer competes for the safe arm. We assume that a player observes her opponent’s actions but not his realised payoffs. She is therefore never certain whether her opponent is still competing for the safe arm. When the players’ prior probabilities of success are sufficiently close, there exists no pure strategy equilibrium, and we characterise the unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Otherwise, the unique equilibrium is in pure strategies. The amount of experimentation performed in equilibrium is inefficiently low but, for many priors, higher than if successes are publicly observed.

中文翻译：

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停止拥塞和私人收益

摘要 本文分析了一个多臂强盗的两人停止游戏，其中每个玩家在了解她的私人风险臂的质量和竞争使用单个共享安全臂之间进行选择。玩家冒险武器的素质是独立的。风险臂获得成功的玩家不再竞争安全臂。我们假设玩家观察她对手的行为而不是他实现的收益。因此，她永远无法确定她的对手是否仍在争夺安全臂。当参与者的先验成功概率足够接近时，不存在纯策略均衡，我们刻画独特的混合策略均衡。否则，唯一均衡是纯策略。在平衡状态下进行的实验量很低，但是，