Abstract For a strong presence of online channel with superior policy traditional brick and mortar channel is losing its footprint rapidly. Under this situation does retail channel survive? To analyze this paper considers a retail-e-tail channel supply chain, where the retailer sells an extended warranty policy purely for its existence given the fierce price competition with the e-tail channel. It is realized that by selling a properly designed extended warranty policy the retailer generates a higher rate of profit margin than the manufacturer. Longer duration of extended warranty at a lower price attracts more customers to buy through the retail channel and hence enhances the retailer’s profit margin. Two different coordination contract mechanisms, namely, all unit quantity discount along with franchise fee, and revenue sharing contracts are proposed to resolve channel conflict and asymmetric Nash bargaining product is used for a particular profit split. It revels under any circumstance the retailer denies manufacturer’s warranty cost-sharing proposal for a better pay off.

中文翻译：

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延长保修期是否描绘了零售商在零售电子零售渠道供应链中的竞争优势

摘要 由于具有优势政策的在线渠道的强大存在，传统的实体渠道正在迅速失去其足迹。在这种情况下，零售渠道还能生存吗？为了分析本文，考虑了零售电子零售渠道供应链，考虑到与电子零售渠道的激烈价格竞争，零售商销售延长保修政策纯粹是为了它的存在。人们意识到，通过销售设计合理的延长保修政策，零售商比制造商产生更高的利润率。以更低的价格获得更长的延长保修期，吸引更多客户通过零售渠道购买，从而提高零售商的利润率。两种不同的协调合同机制，即所有单位数量折扣和特许经营费，并提出收入分享合同来解决渠道冲突，非对称纳什讨价还价产品用于特定的利润分配。在任何情况下，零售商都会拒绝制造商的保修成本分摊建议，以获得更好的回报。