We consider a system in which there exists two ISPs, one “big” Content Provider (CP), and a continuum of End-Users (EUs). One of the ISPs is neutral and the other is non-neutral. We consider that the CP can differentiate between ISPs by controlling the quality of the content she is offering on each one. We also consider that EUs have different levels of innate preferences for ISPs. We formulate a sequential game, and explicitly characterize all the possible Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of the game. We prove that if an SPNE exists, it would be one of the five possible strategies each of which we explicitly characterize. We prove that when EUs have sufficiently low innate preferences for ISPs, a unique SPNE exists in which the neutral ISP would be driven out of the market. We also prove that when these preferences are sufficiently high, there exists a unique SPNE with a non-neutral outcome in which both ISPs are active. Numerical results reveal that the neutral ISP receives a lower payoff and the non-neutral ISP receives a higher payoff (most of the time) in a non-neutral scenario. However, we identify scenarios in which the non-neutral ISP loses payoff by adopting non-neutrality. We also show that a non-neutral regime yields a higher welfare for EUs in comparison to a neutral one if the market power of the non-neutral ISP is small, the sensitivity of EUs (respectively, the CP) to the quality is low (respectively, high), or a combinations of these factors.

中文翻译：

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非中立性对互联网市场的利益相关者有利吗？

我们考虑一个存在两个ISP的系统，一个是“大型”内容提供商（CP），一个是连续的最终用户（EU）。ISP之一是中立的，另一个是中立的。我们认为，CP可以通过控制她在每个ISP上提供的内容质量来区分ISP。我们还认为，欧盟对于ISP具有不同程度的先天偏好。我们制定了一个顺序游戏，并明确描述了该游戏所有可能的子游戏完美纳什均衡（SPNE）。我们证明，如果存在SPNE，它将是我们明确描述的每一种五种可能策略中的一种。我们证明，当欧盟对ISP的固有偏好足够低时，就会存在一种独特的SPNE，其中中性ISP将被赶出市场。我们还证明，当这些偏好足够高时，存在一个具有非中立结果的独特SPNE，其中两个ISP都处于活动状态。数值结果表明，在非中性场景中，中性ISP收到的收益较低，而非中性ISP则在大多数情况下获得较高的收益。但是，我们确定了非中立ISP通过采用非中立性而损失收益的情况。我们还表明，如果非中立ISP的市场力量较小，欧盟（分别是CP）对质量的敏感性低，则与中立相比，非中立体制将为欧盟带来更高的福利（分别为高）或这些因素的组合。数值结果表明，在非中性场景中，中性ISP收到的收益较低，而非中性ISP则在大多数情况下获得较高的收益。但是，我们确定了非中立ISP通过采用非中立性而损失收益的情况。我们还表明，如果非中立ISP的市场力量较小，欧盟（分别是CP）对质量的敏感性低，则与中立相比，非中立体制将为欧盟带来更高的福利（分别为高）或这些因素的组合。数值结果表明，在非中性场景中，中性ISP收到的收益较低，而非中性ISP则在大多数情况下获得较高的收益。但是，我们确定了非中立ISP通过采用非中立性而损失收益的情况。我们还表明，如果非中立ISP的市场力量较小，欧盟（分别是CP）对质量的敏感性低，那么与中立相比，非中立体制将为欧盟带来更高的福利（分别为高）或这些因素的组合。