Abstract Need-based transfer systems pool risk among interdependent individuals. Such arrangements are bound by two simple rules: Ask for help only when in need and, if you are able, give help to others who ask. But there may be a temptation for individuals to break these rules for short-term personal profit. Here, we study one factor that may enforce honesty in need-based transfer relationships: the visibility of resources. Across three experiments employing a novel experimental economic game, breaking of both need-based transfer rules increased when resources were hidden rather than visible (Experiment 1: n = 82, online convenience sample from the US; Experiment 2: n = 80, student sample from the US; Experiment 3: n = 42, online convenience sample from the US). Participants with hidden resources were (1) more likely to request help when not actually in need (greediness), and (2) more likely to not fulfill requests from others for help, even when they had sufficient resources available to help (stinginess). These findings highlight the visibility of resources as one potential limitation of cooperative risk pooling systems.

中文翻译：

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当资源被隐藏时，基于需求的传输系统更容易被欺骗

摘要 基于需求的转移系统在相互依赖的个体之间分担风险。此类安排受两个简单规则的约束：仅在需要时寻求帮助，如果有能力，请向其他寻求帮助的人提供帮助。但是，为了短期个人利益，个人可能会违反这些规则。在这里，我们研究了一个可能在基于需求的转移关系中强制诚实的因素：资源的可见性。在采用新型实验经济博弈的三个实验中，当资源隐藏而不是可见时，两种基于需求的转移规则的破坏都会增加（实验 1：n = 82，来自美国的在线便利样本；实验 2：n = 80，学生样本来自美国；实验 3：n = 42，来自美国的在线便利样本）。拥有隐藏资源的参与者（1）更有可能在实际上不需要时请求帮助（贪婪），以及（2）更有可能不满足他人的帮助请求，即使他们有足够的可用资源来提供帮助（吝啬）。这些发现强调了资源的可见性是合作风险分担系统的潜在限制之一。