Consider two profit-maximizing service firms in the presence of congestion-sensitive customers. Firms set their prices and compete to capture market share. We compare cases where the firms can invest either independently (competition) or jointly (co-opetition) in congestion-reduction (CR) activities. Using a stylized analytical model, we find that when the market is covered (that is when everyone buys a product), the firm with a lower marginal CR cost earns more profit under competition than under co-opetition. When the market is uncovered, co-opetition is more profitable if the joint marginal CR cost is less than a threshold. We find that when the market is covered, neither firm makes any CR investment but when the market is uncovered, there will be a CR investment provided the marginal CR cost is lower than a threshold. Our analysis shows that when prices are regulated, firms under competition make CR investments but firms under co-opetition do not. The impact of proximity on each firm’s choice of location under competition and co-opetition are different. We find that if the marginal CR cost under joint investment is larger than a cutoff, then social welfare is also higher under competition than under co-opetition.

考虑存在拥挤敏感客户的两家利润最大化的服务公司。企业设定价格并竞争以占领市场份额。我们比较了企业可以在拥塞减少（CR）活动中独立投资（竞争）或共同投资（合作竞争）的情况。通过使用程式化的分析模型，我们发现当市场被覆盖时（即每个人都购买产品），边际CR成本较低的公司在竞争中比在竞争中获得更多的利润。当市场被发现时，如果联合边际CR成本小于阈值，则竞合更有利可图。我们发现，当市场被覆盖时，两家公司都不会做出任何CR投资，但在发现市场后，只要边际CR成本低于阈值，便会有CR投资。我们的分析表明，当价格受到管制时，处于竞争状态的公司进行CR投资，而处于竞争状态的公司则不进行CR投资。在竞争和合作竞争下，邻近性对每个公司的位置选择的影响是不同的。我们发现，如果联合投资下的边际CR成本大于临界值，那么竞争下的社会福利也比竞合下的更高。