Menninghaus and colleagues (2019) have recently argued that aesthetic emotions constitute a distinct class of emotions. They claim that aesthetic emotions are distinct because they involve an aesthetic evaluation, they are tuned to specific aesthetic virtues, they involve subjectively felt pleasure or displeasure, and predict liking or disliking. Here we examine the theory in the light of psychological and neurobiological empirical findings. We show that Menninghaus and colleagues failed to provide evidence that aesthetic emotions are different than other kinds of emotions in terms of psychological components or neurobiological underpinnings. We present empirical evidence that strongly suggests that affective states observed during aesthetic appreciation events are not distinctly different from affective states observed during other forms of sensory valuation. We conclude that it may be time to retire the idea that aesthetic emotions constitute a special class of human emotions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

中文翻译：

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没有审美情感：对Menninghaus等人的评论。（2019）。

Menninghaus及其同事（2019）最近认为，审美情感构成了独特的情感类别。他们声称审美情感是独特的，因为它们涉及审美评估，针对特定的审美美德进行调整，涉及主观感觉上的愉悦或不悦，并预测喜欢或不喜欢。在这里，我们根据心理和神经生物学的经验研究结果来检验该理论。我们表明，Menninghaus及其同事未能提供证据证明，就心理成分或神经生物学基础而言，审美情感与其他情感不同。我们提供的经验证据强烈表明，在审美欣赏事件中观察到的情感状态与在其他形式的感官评估中观察到的情感状态没有明显不同。我们得出的结论是，也许该放弃关于审美情感构成人类情感的特殊类别的想法了。（PsycInfo数据库记录（c）2020 APA，保留所有权利）。